Implicit Contextual Integrity in Online Social Networks by Criado, Natalia & Such, Jose M.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1016/j.ins.2015.07.013
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Criado, N., & Such, J. M. (2015). Implicit Contextual Integrity in Online Social Networks. INFORMATION
SCIENCES, 325, 48-69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2015.07.013
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
Implicit Contextual Integrity in Online Social Networks
Natalia Criadoa, Jose M. Suchb
aSchool of Computer Science
Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK
n.criado@ljmu.ac.uk
bSchool of Computing and Communications
Infolab21, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
j.such@lancaster.ac.uk
Abstract
Many real incidents demonstrate that users of Online Social Networks need mechanisms that
help them manage their interactions by increasing the awareness of the different contexts
that coexist in Online Social Networks and preventing them from exchanging inappropriate
information in those contexts or disseminating sensitive information from some contexts to
others. Contextual integrity is a privacy theory that conceptualises the appropriateness of
information sharing based on the contexts in which this information is to be shared. Com-
putational models of Contextual Integrity assume the existence of well-defined contexts,
in which individuals enact pre-defined roles and information sharing is governed by an ex-
plicit set of norms. However, contexts in Online Social Networks are known to be implicit,
unknown a priori and ever changing; users relationships are constantly evolving; and the
information sharing norms are implicit. This makes current Contextual Integrity models
not suitable for Online Social Networks.
In this paper, we propose the first computational model of Implicit Contextual Integrity,
presenting an information model for Implicit Contextual Integrity as well as a so-called
Information Assistant Agent that uses the information model to learn implicit contexts,
relationships and the information sharing norms in order to help users avoid inappropriate
information exchanges and undesired information disseminations. Through an experimental
evaluation, we validate the properties of the model proposed. In particular, Information
Assistant Agents are shown to: (i) infer the information sharing norms even if a small
proportion of the users follow the norms and in presence of malicious users; (ii) help reduce
the exchange of inappropriate information and the dissemination of sensitive information
with only a partial view of the system and the information received and sent by their users;
and (iii) minimise the burden to the users in terms of raising unnecessary alerts.
Keywords: Contextual Integrity, Online Social Networks, Norms, Agents, Privacy
1. Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have been a source of privacy concerns and issues since
their early days [35]. These privacy concerns have even increased along the past decade due
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to many real privacy incidents being echoed in the media and users being more aware of
potential privacy issues [18, 70]. Yet there is a lack of effective privacy controls that allow
users to satisfactorily manage their privacy in OSNs [69]. In particular, the exchange of
inappropriate information and the undesired dissemination of sensitive information across
OSNs are very common and represent one of the major concerns for users. These inappropri-
ate exchanges and undesired disseminations have not only caused serious privacy incidents
— e.g., users have lost their jobs [55], have been outed and faced threats to sever family
ties [30], have ended their marriages [67], etc. — but also facilitated other activities such as
social phishing [40], identity theft [6], cyberstalking [47], and cyberbullying [63].
Some voices argue that this is mainly due to the fact that users are no longer able to
share information differently for different contexts or spheres of life (friends, work, etc.)
in the cyber world, as they would usually do in the physical world [79]. There are many
examples in which this is of crucial importance: photos that depict users in embarrassing
situations, indecorous comments, events that reveal some political affiliations, etc. In all
these examples, the specific context determines whether or not the exchange of information
is appropriate — e.g., one may be willing to share her political affiliations with friends but
not with workmates.
Contextual integrity [52] is a modern privacy theory that conceptualises the appropriate-
ness of information sharing based on the contexts in which this information is to be shared.
In particular, contexts are defined considering a set of individuals playing particular roles
and a number of norms that govern information sharing among them. Contextual integrity
is said to be maintained — meaning that there are no privacy breaches — whenever these
information sharing norms are upheld. The information sharing norms have two main pur-
poses: (i) determine what information is appropriate to mention in a particular context,
and (ii) dictate what information can be transmitted from one party to another or others
according to the roles enacted by these parties within and across different contexts.
Computational models of contextual integrity have been recently proposed in the related
literature [4, 43]. Following contextual integrity theory, they assume the existence of well-
defined contexts, in which individuals enact pre-defined roles and information sharing is
governed by an explicit set of norms. However, contexts in OSNs are “implicit, ever changing
and not a priori-known” [19]. In particular, the information sharing norms are known to be
implicit in OSNs [59, 78], i.e., they define the behaviour that is consistent with the most
common behaviour. Moreover, roles are dynamic and may not be known a priori — i.e.,
relationships among individuals in OSNs are constantly evolving [11]. All of these reasons
make explicit contextual integrity and the computational models based on it not suitable
for OSNs.
In this paper, we present the first computational model of implicit Contextual Integrity
for OSNs, which includes an information model and an agent model for a kind of agents
we call Information Assistant Agents (IAAs). IAAs are capable of learning contexts and
their associated information sharing norms even if these are implicit or unknown a priori.
Each IAA monitors the information exchanges of its user and based on this it infers: (i) the
different contexts in which information sharing is to happen; (ii) the relationships among the
individuals in each context; and (iii) the information sharing norms of each context. If IAAs
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detect a potential violation of the information sharing norms, they alert their users, who
have the last word on whether sharing the information or not. Through an experimental
evaluation we demonstrate that IAAs are able to significantly mitigate the exchange of
inappropriate information and the undesired dissemination of sensitive information while
minimising the number of unnecessary alerts raised.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 states the problem we tackle in this pa-
per detailing the exchange of inappropriate information and the undesired dissemination of
sensitive information in OSNs. Section 3 proposes the information model that is used by
IAAs to promote contextual integrity by alerting users when their actions may lead to the
violation of the information sharing norms. The IAA model and its modules are described
in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates the performance of IAAs in a set of examples. Section 6
details the experiments we conducted to evaluate our proposal and the results we obtained.
Section 7 discusses related work. Finally, Section 8 includes some concluding remarks as
well as future work.
2. Problem Statement
IAAs aim to avoid two main privacy threats in OSNs: the exchange of inappropriate
information, and the undesired dissemination of previously exchanged information. Specifi-
cally, they alert their users that sharing some information may lead to some of these threats.
Next, we describe these threats in more detail.
2.1. Inappropriate Information Exchanges
Each context has its own appropriateness norms that determine which information can
be mentioned inside each context. For example, one may not mention her political views in
a work context, but she may do so in a family context [79]. IAAs use the information that
their users exchange with other users in one context to infer the appropriateness norms of
this context. Specifically, the information that is frequently mentioned by the members of a
context is considered as appropriate whereas information that is never or rarely mentioned
is considered as inappropriate. For instance, if most people do not mention their political
views at work, it could be inferred this is not an appropriate topic to exchange in a work
context.
Besides the appropriateness norms of each context, there are situations in which people
decide to exchange information that may be seen as inappropriate. One of the main reasons
that explain this is the creation and reciprocation of close relationships [34]. Indeed, there are
empirical studies that demonstrate the fact that reciprocated communication is the dominant
form of interaction in OSNs [15]. Accordingly, IAAs take into account the appropriateness
of the information that has been exchanged with each user to determine when inappropriate
information is being exchanged to reciprocate a close friend or to create a close relationship.
2.2. Undesired Information Disseminations
Disseminations occur when information disclosed in one context travels to another con-
text. That is, disseminations are inter-context disclosures while exchanges (as stated above)
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are intra-context disclosures. Obviously, if the information to be disclosed is already known
in the contexts were it may be disclosed, then the disclosure of this information in these
contexts cannot entail any new privacy risk. However, disseminations may potentially be
undesired and hazardous when they entail the disclosure of sensitive information that was
previously unknown in a context [68]. Indeed, studies on regrets associated to users’ posts
on OSN highlight the fact that revealing secrets of others is one of the main sources of regret
[79]. For instance, there was a recent case in which the sexuality of a person was leaked
from her friends context to her family context where her sexuality was previously unknown,
causing her being outed and facing threats to sever family ties [30].
A first-line defence against undesired disseminations may be avoiding sharing sensitive
information in contexts in which there are people that could disseminate the information
to other contexts in which this information is previously unknown. Whether these people
decide to disseminate the information or not may depend on the relationship they have
to others. That is, people usually have confidence relationships with others with whom
they decide to share sensitive information expecting them to keep it secret. One can share
some of her deepest secrets with her husband but this may not mean her husband would
disseminate this information to other contexts. Thus, IAAs take into account the knowledge
of the information that has been exchanged with each user to determine when sensitive
information is being exchanged to reciprocate a trusted friend or to create/maintain trust
relationships.
3. Information Model for Implicit Contextual Integrity
In this section, we describe the information model for implicit contextual integrity, which
is used by an IAA (further detailed in Section 4) to assist its user, denoted by α, in sharing
information in the OSN.
The information model considers a set of users U = {α, u1, ..., un} who are members of
and communicate in an OSN. Information exchanged among users is formalised as messages
denoted by tuples 〈g,R, T, S〉; where g ∈ U is the sender user, R ⊆ U is the set formed by
the receiver users, and T and S represent the information that is sent. In general, messages
represent any exchange of information in an OSN, where this information may be photos,
comments, private messages, and so on. Let T = {t1, ..., tm} be a set of key topics or
categories that can be discussed in messages. Then, T ⊆ T is the set of topics discussed in
a message, and S ⊆ U are the users tagged (i.e., associated) in this message. Informally, we
define a context in our problem as a group of users who interact through a specific OSN.
Formally, a context C is a set of users (C ⊆ U). We denote by C = {C1, . . . , Cl} the set of
contexts in which user α interacts with other users. We denote by Cβ the set of contexts
that α and β share:
Cβ = {Ci|∀Ci ∈ C : β ∈ Ci}
3.1. Appropriateness
As aforementioned, we propose that IAAs infer the information sharing norms from the
information that is exchanged in the OSN. This section includes the main definitions used by
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IAAs when inferring the appropriateness norms. In particular, we start by defining the indi-
vidual appropriateness values; i.e., users’ judgement of what is appropriate or inappropriate.
Then, we define context appropriateness values; i.e., contexts’ appropriateness judgement.
Finally, we define the appropriateness of messages.
Definition 1 (Individual Appropriateness). Given a user β ∈ U and a topic t ∈ T ,
we define the individual appropriateness atβ as a real value within the [0, 1] representing the
likelihood that user β approves to exchange information about topic t.
These likelihoods are estimated as frequentist probabilities according to the information
contained in messages that α receives from other users. If an IAA is created to support a
user that is new to the OSN, then there is not prior knowledge that the IAAs can use to
infer the appropriateness of topics. In absence of prior knowledge, the IAA cannot determine
if exchanging information about one topic is appropriate or not and, as a consequence, α
initialises the likelihood values to 0.5, which means that it is equally probable that something
is appropriate or inappropriate [61, 39, 20]. If an IAA is created to support a user that has
been a member of a OSN for a while, then the individual appropriateness values can be
initialised based on the messages sent by each user β (i.e., messages sent by β to α can be
used to infer to what extent β approves to exchange information about the different topics).
Later, the IAA updates these probabilities as it receives messages. For example, if Alice
(denoted by user α) receives a message from Bob (denoted by user β) in which a topic such
as a dirty joke (denoted by t) is mentioned, then this may suggest that Bob considers that
making dirty jokes is appropriate and, therefore, the likelihood atβ is increased accordingly.
Definition 2 (Appropriateness Increase). Given an individual appropriateness value
atβ, we define the appropriateness increase as follows:
fAppropriatenessIncrease(a
t
β) = min{1, atβ +4(atβ)}
where 4 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is an update function.
Information sharing norms of a context may change as time goes by; e.g., revealing personal
information about couples may be appropriate for groups of young friends but it may be-
come inappropriate when these friends grow up and they are engaged in stable relationships.
In absence of information that sustains the approval of exchanging information about some
topic, it seems reasonable to consider that it is becoming less usual and finally even dis-
approved. Therefore, the likelihoods that represent appropriateness also decay with time.
Definition 3 (Appropriateness Decay). Given an individual appropriateness value atβ,
we define the appropriateness decay as follows:
fAppropriatenessDecay(a
t
β) = max{0, atβ −5(atβ)}
where 5 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is an update function.
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If β exchanges information about one topic, it means that it approves to exchange infor-
mation about this topic. However, if β does not exchange information about this topic, it
does not necessarily mean β disapproves to exchange information about this topic. As a
consequence, we define that for any likelihood value δ ∈ [0, 1], 4(δ)5(δ).
Given a context C ∈ C and a set of topics T ⊆ T , we denote by ATC the set of the
likelihoods that users in C approve to exchange information about topics in T :
ATC = {atβ|β ∈ C ∧ t ∈ T}
In the information model, the likelihoods that other users approve to exchange informa-
tion about topics are used to determine when a communicative action (i.e., a message sent by
its user) can be seen as inappropriate. Assume that α wants to send a message (〈α,R, T, S〉)
in which it exchanges information about a set of topics T . Assume also that the message
belongs to just one context C ∈ C. Thus, α uses its likelihoods that other users in context C
approve to exchange information about topics in T to determine the appropriateness of this
message. For example, Alice wants to send a message to Bob in which she makes a dirty
joke. Given that Bob is a workmate of Alice (the work context is denoted by CWork), the
IAA uses the likelihoods that other workmates approve to exchange dirty jokes to determine
the appropriateness of this message.
Definition 4 (Context Appropriateness). Given a context C ∈ C and a set of topics
T ⊆ T , we define the context appropriateness as follows:
fContextAppropriateness(C, T ) = fCombine(A
T
C)
where fCombine : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1] is a function that combines the different likelihood values into
a single value.
fCombine may be defined differently according to the requirements of each user. For
example, extremely cautious users may be interested in defining it as the minimum to avoid
mentioning any topic that may be seen as inappropriate by someone.
Let us assume now that α wants to send a message but that the context of this message
is unknown a priory. We determine the context of this message considering both the set of
receiver users and the set of users associated with the information. Informally, we define the
context of a message as the context in which the overlap among its members and the users
involved in the message (i.e., the receiver and the tagged users) is maximal. For example,
Alice wants to send a message (denoted by 〈α,R, T, S〉) to Mary (denoted by user γ so that
R = {γ}) in which she mentions that she, Bob and Charlie (denoted by user pi), who is also
a workmate, will attend a training event (thus S = {α, β, pi}). Mary is both Alice’s best
friend and a workmate; thus, this message might belong to the work and friend contexts.
Given that the majority of the people involved in the message belong in the work context,
it is highly possible that this message belongs in the work context.
Definition 5 (Message Context). Given a message 〈α,R, T, S〉, we define the contexts
of a message as follows:
fContext(〈α,R, T, S〉) = arg max
C∈C
|C ∩ (R ∪ S)|
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In our example, Alice wants to send a message to Mary in which she mentions that she,
Bob and Charlie will attend a training event. In this case, the set of contexts in which Alice
interacts with other persons are: the work context denoted by CWork (note that β, pi, γ ∈
CWork); and the friend context denoted by CFriend (note that γ ∈ CFriend and β, pi 6∈ CFriend).
According to definition 5, the context of this message is CWork since |CWork∩{β, pi, α, γ}| = 3
is greater than |CFriend ∩ {β, pi, α, γ}| = 1.
Note, however, that the previous function may also return more than one context in
other situations. For example, Alice sends a message to Mary who is a workmate and a
friend (remember γ ∈ CFriend and γ ∈ CWork) and this message may belong to the work
and the friend contexts. Thus, any function that calculates the appropriateness of messages
must take into account that a message may belong to more than one context and that this
message can be interpreted differently in each context. IAAs want to prevent their users
from exchanging information about topics that could be seen as inappropriate in any of
the possible contexts. Thus, they calculate the appropriateness of messages considering the
context in which this will be less appropriate.
Definition 6 (Message Appropriateness). Given a message 〈α,R, T, S〉, we define the
message appropriateness as follows:
fAppropriateness(〈α,R, T, S〉) = min
C∈fContext(〈α,R,T,S〉)
fContextAppropriateness(C, T )
As previously mentioned, people might be willing to exchange inappropriate information
with those ones that have previously exchanged inappropriate information with them. For
example, Alice may be willing to exchange a dirty joke with Bob (remember that Bob is a
work mate), even if this may be seen as inappropriate in the work context because Bob and
Alice have a close relationship and it is common that they exchange this kind of jokes. To
take this into account, the IAA needs to know which information has been exchanged with
the rest of users. We define the appropriateness exchange list with β (denoted by Aβ) as
the set formed by the appropriateness of all messages that have been exchanged between α
and β. Note that this list contains the appropriateness of messages (not the messages) and,
as consequence, the IAA does not store messages sent or received by its user. In absence
of prior knowledge, this list is initialised as the empty list. This appropriateness exchange
list is used by the IAA to know with whom inappropriate information has been exchanged
in the past and, on the basis of that information, to determine which users have a close
relationship with its user.
3.2. Information Dissemination
Disseminations occur when the information that has been exchanged in one context is
leaked in contexts where this information is unknown. Thus, it is crucial to enable IAAs
with capabilities that allow them to anticipate dissemination before it happens. We propose
that IAAs use the messages sent and received in which users are tagged explicitly (e.g., a
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user tagged in a photo) to calculate the knowledge of the associations between users and
topics (e.g., the relationship between Bob and the topic homosexuality) and determining
which ones are unknown. Again, we start by defining the individual knowledge values, then
we define context knowledge values, and finally we define the knowledge of messages.
Definition 7 (Individual Knowledge). Given any two different users γ, β ∈ U and a
topic t ∈ T , we define the individual knowledge kγ,tβ as a real value within the [0, 1] interval
representing the likelihood that β knows the association of user γ with topic t.
As in case of the individual appropriateness values, the individual knowledge values can be
initialised considering the existence of previous messages received by α. In the absence of
this information, the individual knowledge values are initialised to 0.5.
As α receives messages from other users, the IAA uses the information contained in mes-
sages for updating these likelihoods. For example, if Alice receives a message (〈β,R, T, S〉)
in which Bob (β) tells to Charlie and Alice (R = {α, pi}) that Mary (S = {γ}) has been
promoted (T = {t}; where t denotes the promotion topic), then the IAA has some evidence
that sustains the fact that Bob knows the association of Mary with the promotion topic.
Moreover, the IAA also infers that the rest of receiver users (Charlie) know the association
of Mary with the promotion topic. However, it may be the case that Bob forwarded this
message without paying much attention to it or analysing it properly. Similarly, it may be
the case that Charlie never reads this message. Because of this, the IAA cannot be com-
pletely sure that users on S and R know the association of γ with topic t and it cannot set
knowledge likelihoods to 1. Thus, the IAA can only increase the likelihood that users on S
and R know the association of γ with topic t.
Definition 8 (Knowledge Increase). Given an individual knowledge value kγ,tβ , we define
the knowledge increase as follows:
fKnowledgeIncrease(k
γ,t
β ) = min{1, kγ,tβ +4(kγ,tβ )}
The information that we know may change as time goes by (e.g., the relationship status of
our Facebook friends changes along time) or, even, users may forget information (e.g., we
can forget about the hundreds of Facebook events to which we have been invited), thus the
knowledge likelihoods decrease lightly with time.
Definition 9 (Knowledge Decay). Given an individual knowledge value kγ,tβ , we define
the knowledge decay as follows:
fKnowledgeDecay(k
γ,t
β ) = max{0, kγ,tβ −5(kγ,tβ )}
Given a context C ∈ C, user γ ∈ U and a set of topics T ⊆ T we denote by Kγ,TC the set
of likelihood that the association of user γ with topics in T is known by users in C:
Kγ,TC = {kγ,tβ |β ∈ C ∧ t ∈ T}
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Assume that α wants to send a message (〈α,R, T, S〉) to β (R = {β}) in which user
γ (S = {γ}) is associated with topics T . Upon receiving the message β would know that
association and could disclose it in other contexts. This may cause that β disseminates the
information received from α. This dissemination can be critical if β reveals the association
of γ with topics in T in contexts where γ belongs and this association is unknown. Assume
that γ and β belong to a context C, then α can calculate the knowledge within context C of
the relationship between γ and topics in T by considering the likelihood that the association
of user γ with topics T is unknown by users in C. For example, Alice knows that Mary is
pregnant. No one else has talked about Mary’s pregnancy at work. Thus, Alice assumes
that this information about Mary is unknown at work.
Definition 10 (Context Knowledge). Given a context C ∈ C, we define the knowledge
within context C of the relationship between γ ∈ U and topics in T ⊆ T as follows:
fContextKnowledge(C, γ, T ) = fCombine(K
γ,T
C )
Given that any message can be sent to a set of receiver users R and may tag a set of
users S, the previous function should be extended to several receiver and tagged users. This
also entails that there may be several contexts where information can be disseminated. The
IAA wants to avoid disseminations of information that can be unknown in some context.
Thus, the IAA calculates the knowledge considering the least known information that can
be disseminated. For example, Alice may want to send a message to her family (S) in which
she tells about Mary’s pregnancy. Charlie is her brother-in-law (pi ∈ R). Charlie also works
at the same company (i.e., Mary and Charlie share the work context) and, as a consequence,
Charlie might reveal the information about Mary’s pregnancy at work. Thus, this message
may entail the dissemination of unknown information at the work context.
Definition 11 (Message Knowledge). Given a message 〈α,R, T, S〉, we define the knowl-
edge of a message as follows:
fKnowledge(〈α,R, T, S〉) = min∀s∈S,∀r∈R
∀C∈(Cs∩Cr)
fContextKnowledge(C, s, T )
where Cs ∩ Cr represents the contexts shared by s and r.
As previously mentioned, the creation and maintenance of trust relationships explains
the fact that people might be willing to exchange unknown information which those ones
who have previously exchanged unknown information with them. The IAA need to know
the knowledge of the information that has been exchanged with the rest of users. We define
as the knowledge exchange list with β (denoted by Kβ) as the set formed by the knowledge
of all messages exchanged between α and β. In absence of prior knowledge, this list is
initialised as the empty list. The knowledge exchange list is used by the IAA to determine
which users have a trust relationship with its user1. Exchanges of unknown information
1Note that having a close relationship is not the same as having a trust relationship; thus, we need to
maintain two independent exchange lists.
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with these trusted friends would be justified by the disclosure reciprocity phenomenon. For
example, the fact that Alice tells Charlie the information about Mary pregnancy (which
may be disseminated in the work context) would be justified by the fact that Charlie is a
trusted friend of Alice.
4. Information Assistant Agent model
Figure 1 depicts the different modules that make up an IAA. We can see that it is aimed
to be placed between one user and one OSN2. Thus, an IAA is responsible for managing
the interactions (i.e., the messages sent and received) of a single user in an OSN. An IAA
could be implemented on top of an OSN infrastructure (or Social Network Service) as a
Social Networking App running in a trusted server or it could be implemented as a local
Social App that acts as a proxy to access the OSN (e.g., a mobile Social App). Note that as
stated in the previous section, an IAA does not store messages sent/received by their users,
which helps to minimise storage space for the information model, which may be important
to implement an IAA as a local App for resource-constrained devices like smartphones. Note
also that IAAs utilise information that is currently available to users in mainstream OSNs
and their applications —i.e., the content posted and read by users (e.g., tweets) and the
friendship relationships (e.g., the following and follow relationships).
An IAA is composed of 5 different modules: (i) community finding algorithm; (ii) passing
of time function; (iii) message sending function; (iv) message reception function; and (v) the
information model. We already detailed in the previous section the information model, so
this section focuses on explaining the rest of modules, how the information model interacts
with them, and a description of an IAA’s life-cycle.
4.1. Community Finding Algorithm
In OSNs, the individuals that belong to a particular context are commonly referred to
as a community [32]. These communities [32] are natural divisions of network users into
densely connected subgroups. Many OSNs support some notion of community by means of
allowing groups of users (e.g., Facebook groups or Google+ circles). There are even methods
and ready-to-use tools that obtain them automatically using unsupervised machine learning
algorithms [62]. For example, IAAs could make use of existing community finding algorithms
to extract the different communities, such as Infomap [62], which is known to perform
accurately in OSNs like Facebook [26] and is the algorithm IAAs use for the examples and
evaluation we carried out, as described later on in the paper. Note that OSN infrastructures
only allow each user to have a partial view of the OSN (that contains his/her friends and
mutual friends). That is, each IAA needs to elicit the contexts in which its user is involved
by considering a partial view of the network (also known as ego-network).
The community finding algorithm can be executed by IAAs on the background without
interfering with the users’ actions. Specifically, IAAs can recalculate the communities at
regular time intervals or after an event, e.g., any time there is a change in the friend network.
2Note that our model does not consider explicitly the existence of multiple interacting OSNs. However,
multiple interacting OSNs can be combined using the approach proposed in [9] and [10].
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Figure 1: Components and placement of an Information Assistant Agent.
4.2. Passing of Time
The pseudo code corresponding to this function is depicted in Algorithm 1. At this
step, an IAA updates likelihoods as the times goes by. Specifically, the IAA applies the
decay functions to the appropriateness likelihoods to model the fact that, in absence of new
information that sustains the appropriateness of exchanging information about a topic, this
appropriateness degrades over time (see line 3). Similarly, the IAA applies the knowledge
decay function, which models the fact that, in absence of new information that reveals the
association between a user and a topic, the knowledge of such association decreases (see line
6).
Algorithm 1 Passing of Time Function
1: for all β ∈ U do
2: for all t ∈ T do
3: atβ ← fAppropriatenessDecay(atβ)
4: for all γ ∈ U do
5: if γ 6= β then
6: kγ,tβ ← fKnowledgeDecay(kγ,tβ )
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: end for
Note that the passing of time function can be executed on the background by an IAA at
regular time intervals without delaying its user’s actions.
4.3. Message Reception
The pseudo code corresponding to this function is depicted in Algorithm 2. At this step,
an IAA processes the messages received by its user. Messages are received in the input
mailbox (InBox). The IAA treats the messages received in the input mailbox in FIFO
order for:
1. Updating the exchange lists. The IAA computes the appropriateness of all messages
its user receives to update the appropriateness exchange list with the sender user of
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each message (line 3). Similarly, the knowledge of messages is used to update the
knowledge exchange list (line 4).
2. Updating the appropriateness likelihoods. All topics mentioned in a message are used
to update the likelihood that the sender approves to exchange information about these
topics (line 6).
3. Updating the knowledge likelihoods. All topics exchanged in a message are used to
update the likelihood that the association of the tagged users with the topics is known
by the sender (line 8). Similarly, the likelihood that the association of the tagged users
with the topics is known by the rest of message receivers is increased as well (line 10).
Algorithm 2 Message Reception Function
1: while InBox is not empty do
2: Retrieve 〈β,R, T, S〉 from InBox
3: Aβ ← Aβ ∪ {fAppropriateness(〈β,R, T, S〉))}
4: Kβ ← Kβ ∪ {fKnowledge(〈β,R, T, S〉)}
5: for all t ∈ T do
6: atβ ← fAppropiatenessIncrease(atβ)
7: for all s ∈ S do
8: ks,tβ ← fKnowedgeIncrease(ks,tβ )
9: for all r ∈ R do
10: ks,tr ← fKnowledgeIncrease(ks,tr )
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: end while
The message reception function is executed every time a new message is received. In
the worst case, the temporal cost of this function is O(TF 2), where T is the number of
topics and F is the number of friends in the social network. Among adult Facebook users
the median number of friends3 is 200. For example, works on NLP state that there are 36
key concepts on written English Rayson. According to recent statistics, the average social
network user receives 285 pieces of content daily4. Thus, on average the IAA executes the
message reception function, which has a polynomial cost, less than 300 times a day. Besides
that, that this function does not require the intervention of users. That is, the messages
received by an IAA can be straightforwardly delivered to its user while the IAA executes
the message reception function on the background.
4.4. Message Sending
The pseudo code corresponding to this function is depicted in Algorithm 3. At this step,
the IAA processes the messages that its user wants to send before they are actually sent.
3Source: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/
4Source: http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Resources/FunFacts.aspx
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The user leaves the messages she wants to send in the output mailbox (OutBox). Before
these messages are sent, the IAA analyses the messages and tries to prevent their users from
sending messages in which inappropriate information would be exchanged and/or unknown
information could be disseminated. In particular, the IAAs analyses the messages to be sent
to:
1. Check the appropriateness of messages, which is computed for each message (line 4).
The value of the message appropriateness models the suitability of a message with
respect to the information sharing norms. Besides, and as aforementioned, people
usually reveal inappropriate information (e.g., embarrassing information) to create
and/or to reciprocate close relationships. Thus, the appropriateness of the messages
that have been exchanged with each receiver is computed as well (line 4). This value
models the level of closeness of the relationship between the sender and the receiver.
To compute the appropriateness of the messages that have been previously exchanged
with each receiver, the IAA uses fAggregate : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1], which is a function that
maps a set of real numbers within the [0, 1] interval to a real number within the [0, 1]
interval. This function aggregates all the appropriateness likelihoods (vs. knowledge
likelihoods) stored in the exchange list with a receiver user Ar into a single value.
After this, the IAA checks the appropriateness of the message being analysed with
respect to the appropriateness of the messages that have been previously exchanged
with the receiver. If the appropriateness of a message is less than the appropriateness
of the messages that have been exchanged with the receiver, then the IAA alerts its
user about the risks of such action and asks its user to confirm the sending operation5.
2. Avoid undesired disseminations. An IAA also tries to avoid that its user sends messages
that may lead to the dissemination of sensitive and unknown information. Specifically,
the knowledge of messages is also computed for each message (line 11). The value of
the message knowledge models the sensitivity of a message. The lower the knowl-
edge of a message, the higher the probability it contains sensitive information whose
dissemination is undesirable. People usually share unknown information to create or
maintain trust relationships (e.g., I would reveal my husband confidential information
about a common friend). The knowledge of the messages that have been exchanged
with each receiver is also computed (line 11). When the knowledge of a message is
less than the knowledge of the messages that have been exchanged with the receivers,
then the IAA alerts its user about the risks of such action and asks its user to confirm
the sending operation.
3. Update the exchange lists. If the message is finally sent, then the IAA computes
the appropriateness of the messages sent by the user to update the appropriateness
exchange list with the receiver users (line 18). Similarly, the knowledge of messages is
used to update the knowledge exchange list (line 19).
5For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we only show in this paper where the alerts would be raised,
but please note that the alerts could be much more informative than what is shown in Algorithm 3. For
instance, an IAA could use all the information it has about the receivers, information appropriateness, and
previous messages exchanged to craft a more informative alert to be conveyed to its user.
13
4. Update the knowledge likelihoods. If the message is finally sent, then all topics men-
tioned in a message are used by the IAA to update the likelihoods that the association
of the tagged users with topics mentioned in the message is known by the receivers
(line 22).
Algorithm 3 Message Sending Function
1: while OutBox is not empty do
2: Retrieve 〈α,R, T, S〉 from OutBox
3: for r ∈ R do
4: if fAppropiateness(〈α,R, T, S〉) < fAgreggate(Ar) then
5: continue← receiveDecision(‘This may be inappropiate’)
6: if ¬continue then return
7: end if
8: end if
9: end for
10: for r ∈ R do
11: if fKnowledge(〈α,R, T, S〉) < fAgreggate(Kr) then
12: continue← receiveDecision(‘This may disseminate sensitive information’)
13: if ¬continue then return
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: for r ∈ R do
18: Ar ← Ar ∪ {fAppropiateness(〈α,R, T, S〉)}
19: Kr ← Kr ∪ {fKnowledge(〈α,R, T, S〉)}
20: for all t ∈ T do
21: for all s ∈ S do
22: ks,tr ← fKnowledgeIncrease(ks,tr )
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
26: Send 〈α,R, T, S〉
27: end while
The message sending function is executed before a new message is actually sent. This is
the only function that may require the intervention of users by asking them to confirm the
sending operation. That is, if the IAA raises an alert, its user needs to confirm whether the
message should finally be sent or not. Otherwise, the message will be sent straightforwardly.
In the worst case, the temporal cost of this function is O(TF 2), where T is the number
of topics and F is the number of friends in the social network. Recent studies on sharing
behaviour on social network, showed that users users send messages less frequently than
they receive messages6. Thus, the message sending function will be executed significantly
less times than the message reception function.
6Source: http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/01/PI_SocialMediaUpdate20144.pdf
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As aforementioned, there is a single IAA situated between the user and the ONS. How-
ever, it may be possible to distribute the computation performed by an IAA into a set of
specialized IAAs. For example, the messages sent and received can be distributed among
specialized IAAs according to the context. Thus, each IAA is responsible for controlling
the interactions of a user within a given context. Finally, it is also possible to dynamically
adapt the number of IAAs by performing cloning and self-deletion operations. However, the
definition of more elaborated procedures for adapting dynamically to changing environments
[51] is a complex issue that is out the scope of this paper.
5. Illustrative Examples
This section illustrates the performance of the IAA in a few representative examples. In
particular, these examples are aimed at showing the capabilities of IAAs to deal with: (i)
evolving relationships between users; (ii) dynamic contexts; and (iii) distinguishing unusual
information from inappropriate information.
5.1. Evolving Relationships
To illustrate the performance of IAAs when dealing with evolving relationships between
users, let us assume the existence of a user α who has just started working at a new company.
α uses the IAAs to interact with his workmates, represented as the context Cwork = {β, γ, δ},
through an OSN. Initially, none message has been exchanged between them. As a result,
all the individual appropriateness values are set to 0.5 (i.e., ∀c ∈ Cwork, t ∈ T : atc = 0.5).
Similarly, the appropriateness exchange lists are empty (i.e., ∀c ∈ Cwork : Ac = ∅). From
that moment on, several messages containing the work topic (i.e., messages about tasks,
meetings, etc.) are exchanged between them. Thus, the work topic is seen by all users as
appropriate (i.e., ∀c ∈ C : aworkc ≈ 1), whereas the rest of topics are seen as inappropriate
(i.e., ∀c ∈ Cwork, t ∈ T : t 6= work ∧ atc ≈ 0). Similarly, the appropriateness exchange
lists contain a list of increasing values (i.e., ∀c ∈ Cwork : Ac ≈ {0.5, 0.7, . . . , 1, 1, 1}), which
represents the fact that the work topic has become more appropriate to the group as they
have advanced in their professional relationship.
At some point, α and β realised they both support Manchester United and they begin to
exchange some football videos between them. Obviously this causes that the IAA infers that
β considers as appropriate to exchange information about the sport topic (i.e., asportβ ≈ 1).
However, the IAA infers that among the work friends the sport topic is mostly inappropriate
(i.e., fContextAppropiateness(Cwork, {sport})  1), since the rest of friends never mentioned it.
This causes that the IAA infers that β has become a close colleague and the relationship
between them has evolved (i.e., Aβ = {. . . , 1, . . . , 0.3, 0.3}), since there are some common
interests that lead to messages including inappropriate topics. Because of that, when α
sends a message to β with the sport topic no alert is raised (note that the IAAs knows
that the sport topic is inappropriate for the work context, but α and β usually exchange
information that is not appropriate for this context).
Sometime afterwards, β becomes α boss and he thinks that he needs to have a more
professional relationship with his workmates (the relationship evolves again). As a result, β
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Figure 2: Friend Network in the Evolving Context Scenario. Users are represented by smiley faces, friend
relationships between users are represented by lines, and contexts are represented by bold ellipses.
stops sending messages about the sport topic, and only exchanges work-related information
with α. As a consequence, the appropriateness exchange list reflects that lately β has only
being exchanging appropriate information (i.e., Aβ = {. . . , 1, 1, 1}). Thus, the next time α
tries to send a message to β containing football information, the IAAs will raise an alert
indicating that this may been seen as inappropriate. Then, α must decide between sharing
the information anyway (trying to rebuild the relationship) or not sharing, thus abiding by
the new roles.
5.2. Evolving Contexts
In this example, we will focus on a situation in which contexts evolve. Let us assume
the same user α with the same three workmates β, γ and δ. α has not defined any group
on the OSN and the IAA uses the community finding algorithm to infer that β, γ and δ
belong to the same context (i.e., Cwork = {β, γ, δ}). The social network corresponding to
this situation is depicted in Figure 2a.
At some point, α and δ start a weekly photography course. In the first class, they meet
 and become his friends on the social network. This situation is represented in Figure 2b.
As a result of this change in α’s friend network, the IAA executes the community finding
algorithm. In the absence of more information about user-generated groups, the algorithm
assigns  to the work context (i.e., Cwork = {β, γ, δ, }).
In the second week, δ decides to leave the course whereas α and  attend the second
class. In that class, they meet ζ and η and become their friends on the social network. This
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situation is represented in Figure 2c. As a result of this change in α’s friend network, the
IAA executes the community finding algorithm. Thanks to the new friend relationships, the
algorithm identifies correctly the work context (i.e., Cwork = {β, γ, δ}) and the photography
course context (i.e., Ccourse = {, ζ, η}).
This example illustrates how IAAs are able to deal with the dynamic creation of unfore-
seen contexts.
5.3. Distinguishing Inappropriate Information from Unusual Information
As previously mentioned, the likelihood values of the proposed information model are
estimated as frequentist probabilities. This entails that topics that are frequently discussed
by users in a context are seen as appropriate. Topics that are never mentioned may be inap-
propriate or unusual. This example illustrates how IAAs distinguish between inappropriate
and unusual information.
Let us assume the same users α, β, γ and δ. As previously mentioned, these users use the
OSN to exchange work-related information. Thus, the topic work is considered as appropri-
ate by the IAAs. Any time α decides to send a message discussing work-related issues, the
IAA processes the message without raising any alert. At some point, α sends a message con-
taining an invitation to his wedding. The IAA raises an alert informing α about the fact that
the message may be seen as inappropriate (i.e., fContextAppropiateness(Cwork, {marriage}) = 0
since ∀c ∈ Cwork : amarriagec = 0). α confirms the sending operation. As a result, β, γ and δ
express their joy (e.g., they like the original post) and reply to the original post (e.g., they
make comments on the post indicating whether or not they will attend the wedding). All
these messages entail that the IAA increases the appropriateness of the marriage topic (i.e.,
∀c ∈ Cwork : amarriagec  0). When α decides to send other messages with further details
about the wedding, the IAA does not raise any alert.
Let us assume a different situation in which α decides to send a message containing an
obscene joke. Given that the obscene topic has never been mentioned before, the IAA raises
an alert (i.e., fContextAppropiateness(Cwork, {obscene}) = 0 since ∀c ∈ Cwork : aobscenec = 0).
However, α decides to send the message anyway. However, β, γ and δ think that the joke is
in bad taste and they ignore it (e.g., they do not comment it , like it or retweet it). As a result,
the appropriateness of the obscene topic does not increase (i.e., ∀c ∈ Cwork : aobscenec = 0).
When α decides to send another message containing an obscene joke the IAA raises an alert.
At this point, α might realise that their friends do not approve this kind of information and
decide to stop sending these messages.
This example shows how IAAs can distinguish between inappropriate and unusual in-
formation. In both cases the IAA raises an alert when the first message is sent. However,
the IAA only continues to raise alerts when the information is inappropriate (e.g., obscene
jokes), not when it is unusual (e.g., wedding details). In particular, the fact that users of
OSNs usually show their support for specific comments, pictures, posts, etc. can be exploited
to distinguish unusual form inappropriate information. Indeed, recent statistics show that
this form of communication (i.e., likes and comments) is prevalent in OSNs7.
7According to Instagram statistics, on average 2.5 billion likes are sent diary, whereas only 70 million
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6. Evaluation
To analyse how the IAAs works and to validate our hypothesis about their behaviour,
this section analyses the properties of IAAs regarding: contextual integrity maintenance,
information sharing norm learning, alert notifications to their users, effect of environmen-
tal parameters, and robustness to malicious users. To this aim, we conducted a series of
experiments illustrating the behaviour exhibited by IAAs considering a wide range of dif-
ferent situations and conditions, modelling scenarios with real OSN characteristics (e.g.,
scale-free networks, few strong ties, etc.) and heterogeneous users with different attitudes
and preferences.
6.1. Setting Description
We considered users who are members of an OSN and who initially have some pieces of
information that can be exchanged. As they receive information from others, they acquire
new pieces of information that can also be exchanged. Parameters and their default values
(which change depending on the experiment) are described in Table 1. Each user on the
OSN has been implemented as a user agent. There is a set U of 100 user agents among
which friendship relationships are randomly created following a scale-free pattern, according
to empirical studies that prove OSNs are scale-free [49]. In our scenario, we assume that
users can only exchange information with their friends (as occurs in Facebook and other
mainstream OSN). A subset of these friendship relationships is randomly selected to be
close and trusted friend relationships8. Users are grouped forming contexts or communities.
The set of contexts (C) in each simulation (considering the complete view of the social
network) is elicited using the Infomap algorithm [62], which is a clustering algorithm that
has demonstrated high performance when identifying Facebook contexts [26]. Note that
these are unknown to IAAs, which only have an approximation to these contexts in each
simulation by running the same algorithm but with a partial view of the social network from
their users point of view (as stated in Section 4). This makes even more difficult for IAAs
to learn the information sharing norms, but this models the conditions IAAs will actually
face in real OSNs.
Next, we describe how the information sharing norms, users, and IAAs were modelled:
6.1.1. Information Sharing Norm Modelling
At the beginning of each simulation, we created a set of information sharing norms, which
determined the information that is inappropriate in each context and the information that
is sensitive (i.e., mostly unknown) in each context and should not be disseminated. Note
that these norms are implicit and a priori unknown by users and agents.
Definition 12. Formally, the set of information sharing norms is defined as follows:
photos are uploaded per day. Source: https://instagram.com/press/
8For simplicity, in our simulations we have assumed that all close relationships are also trust relationships.
However, our model is able to infer these two types of relationships independently.
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Parameter Default Value
number of user agents 100
number of topics 36
maximum number of topics per message 36
maximum ratio of inappropriate topics in each context 10%
maximum ratio of sensitive associations in each context 1%
number of steps 2000
number of executions 100
Table 1: Parameters and their default values.
N = NInappropiate ∪NSensitive
where:
• NInappropiate is the set of inappropriateness norms that is formed by 〈t, c〉 expressions,
which represent that talking about topic t ∈ T is seen as inappropriate in context c ∈ C;
• NSensitive is the set of sensitiveness norms which is formed by 〈u, t, c〉 expressions,
which represent that the association of user u ∈ U with topic t ∈ T is sensitive (i.e.,
mostly unknown) in context c ∈ C.
We considered a set T of 36 different topics that represent key concepts (e.g., sports, politics,
etc.) and that can be recognised in English text [60]. In each context, we define randomly the
topics that are inappropriate and associations between users and topics that are sensitive: at
maximum 10% of these topics are inappropriate (we vary this later on), so that the number
of inappropriate topics in each context belongs to the interval [1, 4]; and at maximum 1% of
the possible associations between users and topics are sensitive (we vary this later on), so
that the number of sensitive associations in each context belongs to the interval [1, 36].
Social norms, as information sharing norms in OSN, are not created by legal or insti-
tutional authorities. They are established in societies by means of a bottom-up process in
which they emerge from individual behaviour [22]. Specifically, social norms emerge when
they are followed by a considerable portion of the society. To simulate the existence of the
information sharing norms (i.e., the appropriateness and sensitiveness norms IAAs need to
learn), we model a subset of the users in the OSN to be compliant users, who do not use
IAAs but know the norms and follow them; i.e., they simulate people that have the ability
to say always the right thing. Thus, compliant users only send messages that respect the
appropriateness and sensitiveness norms.
6.1.2. User Modelling
Apart from compliant users, we modelled the behaviour of different types of users accord-
ing to a classification of different normative attitudes based on Westin’s privacy attitudes
[44, 73]:
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• Random users are norm unconcerned — i.e., users who do not care about the in-
formation sharing norms, so they do not use IAAs and randomly compose messages
containing information that they know and send them to a random subset of their
friends. These messages can cover any set of topics.
Note that ours is the first model of implicit contextual integrity, thus we cannot com-
pare the performance of IAAs against previous proposals. As a consequence, we will
use random users (which model users who do not use our methods to maintain con-
textual integrity) as a baseline method for comparison, which simulates the current
situation in all OSN infrastructures (like Facebook, Google+, etc.).
• Obedient users are norm fundamentalists — i.e., users who adhere to the information
sharing norms9. They utilise IAAs and are called obedient since they always follow
the recommendations made by their IAAs. Similarly to compliant users, they also try
to comply with the information sharing norms, but they do not know the norms and
rely on IAAs to infer and abide by the norms.
• Relationship-based users are norm pragmatists — i.e., users who make use of casual
forms of information sharing that are not always normative, e.g., when they interact
with a close or trusted friend. They utilise IAAs but they decide not to follow the
recommendations made by IAAs when they send messages to close and trusted friends.
6.1.3. IAAs Implementation
As aforementioned, the information model used by IAAs makes use of several functions
(i.e., update functions, combination function and aggregation function). The propose of this
paper is not to provide or compare different definitions to these functions, but to make use of
these functions in evaluating anew computational model of contextual integrity. The specific
definitions may depend not only on the application domain but also on the personality
traits of users10. As a result, in our experiments IAAs functions are given well-known and
reasonable definitions.
In particular, we define 4 as a constant update rule; i.e., ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] : 4(δ) = x where
x = 0.1. Similarly, we define 5 as a constant update rule; i.e., ∀δ ∈ [0, 1] : 5(δ) = y
where y = 0.01. Constant update rules, which have been previously used in the literature
on norm learning and emergence [7], assume that each IAA will update its likelihood values
in constant increments or decrements.
fCombine is implemented as a harmonic mean, since it mitigates the influence of large
outliers (e.g., close workmates to which inappropriate information is frequently sent).
fAggregate is implemented as a weighted mean where each element is weighted by its index;
so that the most recent elements contribute more to the final value. Formally:
fAggregate(S) =
∑
vi∈S i · vi∑
vi∈S i
9Note that compliant users can also be classified as norm fundamentalists.
10A user study to generate personalised IAAs is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Finally, IAAs initialize randomly the likelihood that other users approve to exchange
topics or know the associations of users with topics. This models a situation in which IAAs
have varied and imperfect prior knowledge available11. More formally, for all user β ∈ U and
topic t ∈ T the value atβ is set to a random real value within the [0, 1] interval. Similarly, for
all pairs of users β, γ ∈ U , where γ <> β and topic t ∈ T the value kγ,tβ is set to a random
real value within the [0, 1] interval.
6.2. Experiments
6.2.1. Contextual Integrity Maintenance
In our first experiment we sought to determine if IAAs contribute to maintain contextual
integrity, i.e., if IAAs help to reduce the exchange of inappropriate information and the
dissemination of sensitive information. To this aim, we simulated societies populated with
compliant users (who know and follow the norms) and obedient users (who use IAAs to infer
and follow the norms). Each simulation was executed during 2000 steps and was repeated 100
times to support the findings. For each execution, we calculated the messages that exchange
inappropriate information and the messages that disseminate sensitive information. We also
repeated this experiment increasing the percentage of compliant users (who know and follow
the norms) in each context from 0% to 90% to test IAAs in a wide range of situations. The
rest of users in each context are obedient users. As a baseline simulation, we repeated this
experiment using compliant users increasing from 0% to 90% and the rest being random
users (who do not make use of IAAs).
Figure 3 shows the behaviour exhibited by random and obedient users in terms of the
exchange of inappropriate information. This figure depicts the average number of messages
that exchange inappropriate information sent by all obedient users and by all random users
per ratio of compliant agents. This figure shows that obedient users (who make use of IAAs)
exchange less inappropriate information than random users (who do not use IAAs) regardless
of the ratio of compliant users. On average, the exchange of inappropriate information in
societies populated by compliant and obedient users is reduced by 90% compared to societies
populated by compliant and random users, which clearly shows that IAAs contribute to
maintain contextual integrity. One can also observe that the exchange of inappropriate
information in societies populated by random users decreases as the ratio of compliant
users increases. Obviously, the less random users, the more compliant users and the less
exchanges of inappropriate information occur. This very same effect can be observed in
obedient users when the ratio of compliant users belongs to the [40%,90%] interval. As
the ratio of compliant users increases more appropriate information is exchanged in the
network and obedient users can infer which topics are appropriate and the exchange of
inappropriate information decreases more easily. In contrast, when there are few compliant
users (i.e., when the ratio of compliant users belongs to the [0%,40%] interval) that exchange
11Note that if we model situations in which all users are new to the OSN and IAAs have no prior knowledge
available, which is highly unlikely in practice; this may lead to all IAAs having the same initial values and
to the emergence of fake norms corresponding to this shared initialization.
21
appropriate information, then obedient users infer that almost all topics are inappropriate
and they end up exchanging less messages12.
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Figure 3: Average number of messages that exchange inappropriate information sent by user type (Y-axis)
per ratio of compliant users (X-axis)
Figure 4 compares the behaviour exhibited by random users against obedient users in
terms of the dissemination of sensitive information. This figure depicts the average percent-
age of messages that disseminate inappropriate information sent by all obedient users and
by all random users per ratio of compliant agents. As we can observe, the results are very
similar to the ones above, i.e., obedient users disseminate less sensitive information regard-
less of the ratio of compliant users. On average, the dissemination of sensitive information
in societies populated by compliant and obedient users is reduced by 89%.
6.2.2. Information Sharing Norm Learning
In the previous experiment, we demonstrated that IAAs maintain contextual integrity
when the network is formed by compliant users (who know and follow the norms) and
obedient users (who try to learn and follow the norms). A more complex scenario arises
when IAAs deal with societies in which there are users that do not care about the information
sharing norms (i.e., random users). In this situation, it is more difficult to infer the norms
on the basis of the information exchanged, since random users exchange appropriate and
inappropriate information indistinctly. To assess to what extent IAAs are able to learn
the information sharing norms in this kind of situations, we performed an experiment in
which we increased the percentage of compliant users in each context from 0% to 90%.
The rest of users in each context was split in 10% of obedient users and the rest being
12Note that IAAs are not able to distinguish compliant users and they infer the norms from the information
that is exchanged in the social network.
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Figure 4: Average percentage of messages that disseminate sensitive information sent by user type (Y-axis)
per ratio of compliant users (X-axis)
random users. Thus, we sought to determine if IAAs are able to infer the norms when
they are not predominant in the society. Again, the simulation was executed during 2000
steps and repeated 100 times. For each execution, we calculated the messages that exchange
inappropriate information and the messages that disseminate sensitive information.
Figure 5 displays the average percentage of messages sent by obedient users (who make
use of the IAAs) that exchange inappropriate information and disseminate sensitive infor-
mation per ratio of compliant agents. This figure shows that the exchange of inappropriate
information and the dissemination of sensitive information are reduced noticeable as the
ratio of compliant users increases. For example, when there are 40% of compliant users
(which implies that there are 10% of obedient and 50% of random users) in each context
the exchange of inappropriate information is reduced by 35% and the dissemination of sen-
sitive information is reduced by 27%. This demonstrates that IAAs learn the information
sharing norms even if compliant users are not predominant in contexts. With regard to
disseminations, we can observe that in general less sensitive disseminations occur. This is
explained by the fact that sensitivity norms relate a specific user with a specific topic and
context, whereas inappropriateness norms only relate a topic with a context. Thus, sensitive
information is scarcer than inappropriate information. When the ratio of compliant users is
very high, then there are more sensitive disseminations than inappropriate exchanges. This
is explained by the fact that sensitiveness norms are more difficult to infer (since they relate
a specific user and topic). As a consequence, the reduction on the exchange of inappropriate
information as the ratio of compliant users increases is less pronounced.
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Figure 5: Average percentage of messages sent by obedient users that exchange inappropriate information
and disseminate sensitive information (Y-axis) per ratio of compliant users (X-axis)
6.2.3. Alerts Raised
This experiment is aimed at assessing the performance of IAAs in terms of the number
of alerts raised and how many of these alerts are not followed by users. To this aim, we
executed simulations populated with compliant users and relationship-based users (who do
not follow the recommendations of IAAs when they exchange information with close and
trusted friends). We set the percentage of compliant users in each context to 40% to model
already emerged information sharing norms, and we increased the number of steps that
of the simulation to determine the number of steps IAAs require to infer the information
sharing norms as well as close and trust relationships. Note that learning close and trust
relationships allow IAAs to avoid raising alerts when violations of the information sharing
norms are explained because the recipients are close or trusted friends. These alerts may be
considered as unnecessary and disturbing since users are unlikely to follow them.
Figure 6 shows that the percentage of messages that raise alerts and the percentage of
messages that raise non-followed alerts decrease exponentially to a low value as the number
of steps increases, i.e., the percentage of messages that raise alerts converges to a value below
25% and the percentage of messages that raise non-followed alerts converges to a value below
5%. This demonstrates that IAAs require a low number of steps to infer the information
sharing norms, and trust and close relationships. Also, the low percentage of non-followed
alerts (5%) demonstrates that IAAs minimise the burden on the users in terms of raising
alerts that would not be followed.
6.2.4. Simulation Parameters
In the previous experiments, we fixed the maximum number of topics discussed in a
message and the maximum ratios of inappropriate topics and sensitive associations. To
24
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Steps
% of Messages that Raise Alerts (Relationship-based Users)
% of Messages that Raise Non-Followed Alerts (Relationship-based Users)
Figure 6: Average percentage of raised alerts and average percentage of non-followed alerts (Y-axis) per
number of steps (X-axis)
analyse the influence of these parameters on the performance of IAAs, we carried out two
experiments in which we fixed the percentage of compliant users in each context to 40% to
model already emerged information sharing norms and the rest of users in each context are
obedient users. We repeated these two experiments using random users instead of obedient
users as a baseline simulation. Each simulation was executed during 2000 steps and repeated
100 times.
Message Composition. In our previous experiments, we wanted to assess the performance
of IAAs in a general situation; i.e., when users are allowed to select any number of topics to
be discussed in a message. Thus, we did not impose any limit on the size of messages. To
analyse the impact of the maximum number of topics discussed in the messages (i.e., the
message size) on the IAAs performance, we carried out an experiment in which we increased
the maximum number of topics that can be discussed in a message from 1 to 35.
Figures 7 and 8 compare the behaviour exhibited by random users against obedient users
in terms of the exchange of inappropriate information and the dissemination of sensitive
information with respect to the maximum number of topics that can be discussed in a
message. As depicted in these two images, the more the topics discussed in messages,
the higher the average percentage of messages that violate some information sharing norm.
Obviously, the more topics are discussed in a message, the higher the probability of including
an inappropriate or sensitive topic. However, the increase on the average percentage of
messages that violate some information sharing norm is noticeably higher in random users
— i.e., the lines corresponding to random users have a significantly higher slope than the
lines corresponding to obedient users. This demonstrates that even if the users are not able
to discern norm-compliant topics to be discussed in messages, IAAs would help them do so.
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Norm Definition. To analyse the impact of the number of norms on IAAs’ performance,
we carried out an experiment increasing the maximum ratio of inappropriate topics in any
context from 5% to 30% and the maximum ratio of sensitive associations between users and
topics from 0.5% to 3%.
Figure 9 compares the behaviour exhibited by random users against obedient users in
terms of the exchange of inappropriate information with respect to the maximum ratio of
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inappropriate topics. Figure 10 compares the behaviour exhibited by random users against
obedient users in terms of the dissemination of sensitive information with respect to the
maximum ratio of sensitive associations between users and topics. In case of random users,
the average percentage of messages that violate some information sharing norm increases as
the ratio of inappropriate topics or the ratio of sensitive associations increases. When the
information to be discussed in a message is randomly selected, the probability of exchanging
sensitive or inappropriate information increases as more information is considered illegal
according to the information sharing norms. In case of obedient users, we obtained the op-
posite results (i.e., the average percentage of messages that violate some information sharing
norm decreases slightly as the two ratios increase). Note that the amount of information
(i.e., information sharing norms) that IAAs have to infer does not depend on the ratio of
inappropriate topics or sensitive associations (i.e., for each topic IAAs have to infer to what
degree it is sensitive or not, appropriate or not) and, as a result, the performance of our
model is not affected negatively by the increase on the value of these ratios. On the con-
trary, IAAs obtain slightly better results when the ratio of inappropriate topics or the ratio
of sensitive associations increases. This is explained by the fact that if more information
is considered illegal according to information sharing norms, then compliant users (who al-
ways comply with information sharing norms) have less information to include in messages.
Because of this, obedient users receive norm-complaint information at a higher frequency,
which facilitates the inference of information sharing norms. Thus, IAAs’ performance scales
very well with increasing ratios of information sharing norms.
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6.2.5. Robustness against Malicious Users
This experiment aimed to analyse the performance of IAAs in presence of malicious
users; i.e., attackers who intend to inject fake messages so as to increase the appropriateness
of a topic. Malicious users exchanged messages that included malicious information (i.e.,
information relative to one inappropriate topic targeted by malicious users). In particular,
we fixed the percentage of obedient users in each context to 10%, and we varied the ratio
of malicious users from 0% to 90%. The rest of users in each context were compliant users.
We repeated this experiment with random users instead of obedient users as a baseline
simulation. Each simulation was executed during 2000 steps and repeated 100 times.
Figure 11 shows the behaviour exhibited by random users and obedient users in terms
of the exchange of inappropriate information. The average percentage of messages sent by
random users that exchange inappropriate information decreases as the percentage of mali-
cious users increases. This is explained by the fact that, malicious users always exchange the
same malicious information, whereas compliant users exchange any information as long as
this information is appropriate. However, a piece of information may be seen as appropriate
in a given context and as inappropriate in another context. Thus, when compliant users
are replaced by malicious users, less information is available in the network, so that random
users have less information at their disposal, which makes them exchange less inappropriate
information. On the contrary, in obedient users, the average percentage of messages that
exchange inappropriate information increases as the percentage of malicious users increases.
However, the average percentage of messages that exchange inappropriate information in-
creases more slowly than malicious users do. In particular, IAAs prove to be robust against a
single malicious user and small to medium-sized groups of malicious users. Indeed, obedient
users behave as random users only when they are completely surrounded by malicious users.
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6.2.6. Realistic User Populations
The previous experiments were aimed at assessing the properties of IAAs with regards
to some specific criteria. For this reason, we generated societies with extreme distributions
of user types. However, these settings may not seem realistic; e.g., a situation in which all
users are unconcerned about the norms is unlikely. In contrast, this section presents a more
realistic simulation in which the distribution of the different user types match the results
of empirical studies on privacy concerns among the general public [72, 44]. In particular,
and according to [72], we have defined the ratio of obedient and compliant users (i.e., norm
fundamentalists) as 26% — from which 15% are compliant users to model the emergence
of norms and the rest are obedient users; the ratio of relationship-based users (i.e., norm
pragmatists) as 64%; and the ratio of random users (i.e., norm unconcerned) as 10%. Besides,
recent studies demonstrate that in OSNs the majority of relationship ties are weak [21, 81].
In particular, and according to [81], we have defined that 10% of the friend relationships are
close and trusted relationships. Finally, each simulation is executed during 4000 steps and
has been repeated 100 times.
Figure 12 displays the average percentage of messages sent by each type of users that
exchange inappropriate information per number of steps that the simulation is executed.
Similarly, Figure 13 displays the average percentage of messages sent by each type of users
that disseminate sensitive information per number of steps that the simulation is executed.
When the number of steps is very small, users have received few messages and they have a few
pieces of information to be sent. Thus, the probability of violating information sharing norms
is low. As the number of steps increases, users have received more pieces of information
and they have more options to violate information sharing norms. As illustrated by these
figures, all users that use IAAs (i.e., obedient and relationship-based) exchange significantly
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less inappropriate information and disseminate significantly less sensitive information than
random users. Specifically, obedient users are the ones that violate less information sharing
norms (obedient users achieve a reduction on norm violations over 70%). This demonstrates
that thanks to IAAs, obedient and relationship-based users, who don’t know the information
sharing norms, are able to comply with them.
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Figure 12: Average percentage of messages sent by each user type that exchange inappropriate information
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7. Related Work
7.1. Contextual Integrity Modelling and Reasoning
Previous work on computational models of contextual integrity proposed mechanisms
for modelling and reasoning about contextual integrity principles. For example, Barth et al.
[4] formalized some aspects of contextual integrity assuming that there is a set of explicitly
defined norms that determine what is permitted and forbidden, that the interactions take
place in well-known contexts, and that interaction participants play a specific role in each
interaction. In a more recent work, Krupa et al. [43] proposed a framework to enforce
information sharing norms in an electronic institution where norms, contexts and roles
are explicitly defined. While these approaches seem appropriate for the kind of domains
described in [4] and [43], in OSNs there are not well-known contexts, there is not an explicit
definition of the roles played by users and the exchange of information is governed by implicit
information sharing norms13.
7.2. Access Control Models for OSNs
The suitability of traditional access control models such as role-based access control [64]
for OSNs has been recently challenged on the basis that they cannot capture the inherent
social nature of OSNs, such as social relationships and distance among users. To address this
limitation, there are new paradigms that precisely emphasise the social aspects of OSNs.
These new paradigms range from cryptographic privacy systems used to define and im-
plement group access policies [2, 36, 46, 75], to relationship-based access control models
[27, 29, 28, 8, 14, 13, 16] that utilise a variety of features or aspects to characterise users’
relationships and define access control decisions based on them.
While these new models represent better frameworks than other traditional access con-
trol approaches to develop tools for defining and enforcing access control policies in OSNs,
access control on its own is unlikely to be the complete and definitive solution for an appro-
priate privacy management in OSNs as users need awareness about access control decisions
to fully understand the consequences of their access control policies [41, 50, 25]. For in-
stance, access control models are known to fail to prevent unintended disclosures [5]. This
is where the implicit contextual integrity approach presented in this paper can make a dif-
ference by complementing these new models by learning implicit information sharing norms
in OSNs and warning users where their defined access control policy may mean that inap-
propriate information would be exchanged or sensitive information would be disseminated
across OSNs.
7.3. Disclosure Decision-Making Mechanisms
In the related literature, the use of software endowed with disclosure decision-making
mechanisms is not new. For example, several authors [76, 42] proposed mechanisms for
13Note that these implicit information sharing norms are normality norms that define the behaviour that
is consistent with the most common behaviour. In contrast, explicit information sharing norms define
behaviour that is normative (i.e., moral).
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computing the privacy-benefit trade-off of information disclosures in online interactions.
The aim is to only disclose information when this trade-off renders appropriate results, i.e.,
where the utility of a particular disclosure is worth the privacy risks/consequences involved
by performing the disclosure. However, these mechanisms have difficulties to deal with sce-
narios where the direct benefit of disclosing a piece of information is a priori unknown or
difficult to express in economic terms, such as OSNs, in which disclosures are mostly driven
by social factors [38]. In a more recent work, Such et al. [71] proposed a mechanism for
entailing agents with capabilities to select the personal attributes of their users to be dis-
closed to other agents during interactions considering the increase on intimacy and privacy
loss a disclosure may cause. However, this mechanism does not consider that the appropri-
ateness of disclosures may vary from context to context, nor does it consider information
disseminations. Also, this mechanism is fully automated whereas in our proposal IAAs only
warn users when information sharing norms may be violated but users have the last word
on whether information is finally shared or not.
7.4. Topic Analysis
Our proposal is based on the existence of a mechanism that is able to determine the
topics discussed by the pieces of information that are exchanged in OSNs (i.e., the messages).
Topics here can be categories predefined by the underlying OSN infrastructure [54]; user-
generated tags like Flickr categories [53]; or categories or tags extracted from images [66, 80],
videos [3], geolocation information [45], or text [57, 74, 12].
A well-known problem of user-generated tags is that the tagging terms are often ambigu-
ous, overly personalised and inexact [37]. Indeed, current OSNs offer little or no synonym
(i.e., different words, same meaning) or homonym (i.e., same word, different meanings) con-
trol [33, 48]. To overcome these problems, recent advances in the field of information sciences
have proposed mechanisms for clustering semantically related tags (i.e., referred as topics in
our paper) [24, 56, 31].
With regard to topic extraction from text, current research in the field of NLP has made
advancements on analysing short messages present in OSN, microblogs, etc. For a review
of these works see [57]. Specifically, there are some NLP proposals endowed with new text-
mining and analysis techniques that analyse short and informal messages with acceptable
accuracy [74]. For example, the Relative Forensics toolkit14 employs, among other features,
the 36 topics used in our experiments to analyse messages online messages. Specifically,
the Relative Forensics toolkit has demonstrated to obtain a successful performance when
detecting deceptive behaviour in online messages [58].
7.5. Norm Learning
Norm learning [23] is the process of learning how to behave in a specific situation. In
case of ONS information-sharing norms are implicit (i.e., there is not an explicit definition
of what is sensitive or inappropriate), and supervised machine learning algorithms cannot
be used to infer information sharing norms.
14http://www.relative-forensics.com
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In the existing literature, social learning [17] of norms is defined as the process of inferring
implicit social norms concurrently over repeated interactions with members of the social
network. In most of the proposals on social learning, norms are inferred by analysing the
outcomes of interactions and normative decisions in terms of utility [65]. As previously
mentioned, in OSN the benefit of exchanging information may be difficult to be determined
in economic terms. In other proposals, norms are inferred by analysing explicit normative
signals such as punishments, sanctions and rewards [77]. These approaches cannot be used
in OSN since implicit information sharing norms are product of informal social control that
is rarely stated explicitly (e.g., sanctions) to unfriendly individuals. Other approaches [23],
use imitation as a mechanism for learning social norms. In these proposals, the norms are
inferred from the public behaviour exhibited by the majority of the members of the social
network (or the majority of the members within an observation radius). A main drawback
of imitation approaches is that all members are equally considered; i.e., they do not consider
the existence of different social contexts with different social norms and the fact that users
engage in relationships of different nature and strength.
These unsupervised machine learning approaches are unsuitable to be applied to ONS.
This paper goes beyond these imitation approaches by considering the specific characteristics
of OSNs, i.e., the existence of different and implicit social contexts with different information
sharing norms, and the existence of different types of relationships between users. In partic-
ular, and to the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first model of social learning of
implicit information sharing social norms based on public and private information exchanges
in OSNs.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed the first computational model for implicit contextual integrity
in OSNs. This model considers that in OSNs contexts are implicit, unknown a priori and
they may change; user relationships evolve; and information sharing norms are implicit, i.e.,
they define the behaviour that is consistent with the most common behaviour. This model
of implicit contextual integrity includes an information model for inferring the information
sharing norms that are in force in OSNs and an Information Assistant Agent model to help
users avoid exchanging inappropriate information and disseminating sensitive information
across ONSs.
The experiments we conducted show that: (i) IAAs are able to infer information sharing
norms even if a small proportion of the users follow the norms and in presence of malicious
users; (ii) IAAs help to reduce the exchange of inappropriate information and the dissemi-
nation of sensitive information with only a partial view of the system and the information
received and sent by their users; and (iii) IAAs minimise the burden to the users in terms
of raising unnecessary alerts.
As future work, we plan to equip IAAs with active mechanisms for detecting malicious
users. As stated in the experiments, IAAs are robust against a single malicious user and
small to medium-sized groups of malicious users. However, this robustness may not hold
when an IAA is completely surrounded by a large number of malicious users. This does not
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mean that the user of the IAA would be more prone to disclose inappropriate information,
but that in the event she decides to disclose inappropriate information, the IAA may not
alert her. Besides, note that these large groups of users would first need to be friends with
IAA’s user (or successfully infiltrate en masse in her friend network), share contexts with
her, and coordinate targeting a particular topic without the user noticing it. Automated
approaches could be envisioned so that a single entity (whether individual or organisation)
controls a large number of accounts to launch such attacks, but this can be mitigated using
existing sybil defences [1, 28].
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